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Why do we laugh? Laughter is a symptom of a positive emotion experienced, for example, 
during play, and is important in both children and adults. We have known for decades that 
play — which is not confined to humans; see articles in 25th anniversary special issue 
of Current Biology on the Biology of Fun (volume 25, issue 1) — contributes to children's 
social, emotional, and cognitive success (for example, Singer et al. 2006). Recent 
evolutionary theory suggests that positive emotions, such as those associated with laughter, 
have a number of benefits to the individual, such as fostering creativity and flexibility in 
thinking, increasing longevity, reducing the effects of health risks, and engendering increased 
likelihood of positive emotions in the future. Here we consider a particular kind of laughter-
evoking play: tickling. 
 
What is a tickle? A tickle is a type of touch that makes you laugh, isn't it? Actually, the word 
tickle refers to two classes of cutaneous sensation (Seldon, 2004): knismesis, a light spidery 
sensation that evokes a shiver or a twitch; and gargalesis, “the exquisitely intense, often 
pleasurable sensation in response to hard, rhythmic probing” (Leavens, 2009). Lightly 
scratching a cat under its chin apparently evokes the knismesic-type of tickling pleasure, 
which in human adults can range from pleasurable (a lover blowing into your ear, for 
example) to startling (when you realise a spider is crawling across your skin, for example). It 
is the gargalesis-type of tickling, however, that elicits unrestrained laughter.  
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Do other animals tickle? Many animals appear to share with our own children the exquisite, 
yet paradoxical delight in response to tickling, including rats (for example Panksepp and 
Burgdorff, 2003), cats, sharks, and notably, the great apes (Davila Ross et al., 2009). Cats 
will sometimes solicit tickling from their owners — rubbing their chins on one's hand, for 
example. But only great apes have been reported to regularly tickle others; indeed, one of the 
earliest communicative signals that chimpanzees learn to use is the ‘tickle solicit’ (Bard et al., 
2014).  
 In the 1970s, the development of the ‘tickle solicit’ behaviour was observed in wild 
infant chimpanzees (Plooij, 1979). When a mother tickles her very young infant in the side of 
the neck, which becomes a favourite tickle spot in juveniles, the infant smiles and brings 
his/her arms up, with the hands protecting the neck. The infant adopts this posture regularly 
and repeatedly across the first months of life while being tickled. Just before the first 
birthday, however, a new behaviour emerges, the infant begins to display this body posture 
while smiling in advance of being tickled, manifestly using this ‘tickle solicit’ gesture, to 
communicate their desire to be tickled.  
 In apes, tickling is distinct from other touching activities, such as grooming, and is 
clearly a kind of play, evoking smiles (commonly called play faces in non-human primates) 
and laughter (sometimes called pant grunts). Tickling play begins early in life as do smiles 
(as early as five weeks of age) and laughter (as early as eight weeks of age, Bard et al., 2014). 
Interestingly, infant chimpanzees rarely tickle others; tickling is frequently initiated by 
mothers and other older chimpanzees toward infants. So while infant chimpanzees actively 
solicit tickling from others, they do not actively tickle others until they are older.  
 
Do animals laugh in response to tickle? We know that some animals do laugh when tickled; 
for example, rats emit special ultrasonic vocalisations when they are tickled, which can be 
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considered a kind of laughter (see video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-
admRGFVNM; Panksepp and Burgdorff, 2003). Tickling evokes laughter in all the great 
apes, humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans (Davila Ross et al., 2009). 
Laughter in humans may well be evolutionarily continuous with tickle-induced vocalizations 
in the other great apes (Davila Ross et al., 2009). 
 
Why can we not tickle ourselves? It has been a puzzle as to why we cannot tickle ourselves. 
The prevailing theory is that when the tickling sensations are predictable, they don’t evoke 
laughter or the gargalesis responses: in other words, it is the unpredictable quality of tickling 
that evokes our intense response to it. (The reader can easily confirm this by rhythmically 
poking a finger at themselves; most of us remain untickled, even in ‘ticklish’ areas.) When 
we attempt to tickle ourselves, our outgoing motor commands are associated with predictions 
of motor action, which prospectively cancel the tickling sensations (Blakemore et al., 1999; 
Chambon and Haggard, 2013).  
To test this idea, we can create experimental conditions to allow for self-tickling. For 
instance, self-tickling becomes possible when a time delay is imposed between the initiated 
action and the perception of tickling or when the spatial disparity between the actions 
initiated and the actions delivered to the skin is increased (Blakemore et al., 1999). 
Strikingly, Blakemore and colleagues (2000) found that people with symptoms of 
schizophrenia did not discriminate between self- and other-initiated tickle under these 
experimental conditions, which is consistent with their difficulty in assigning a locus of 
agency. If a person cannot distinguish who is initiating a tickle, the self or someone else, then 
self-tickling becomes possible. Thus, the inability to tickle oneself, coupled with our 
capacities both for being tickled and for tickling others, is an example of the discrimination 
our brain makes between ‘self’ and ‘other’ (Figure 2). 
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What is the self? Typically, we think of knowing our ‘self’ as a type of metacognition — 
being aware that we are aware. We typically assess the development of the sense of self in 
humans and great apes by testing whether an individual can pass the mark-and-mirror test 
(for example, Bard et al., 2006). This means that, when we look into the mirror and see a 
coloured mark alongside our nose, for instance, when we attempt to remove it we touch the 
mark on our own face, and not the mirror image. Children typically pass this mark-and-mirror 
test around 18–24 months of age, although there is cultural variation, and laboratory-housed 
chimpanzees pass the mark test at about 28 months. 
 
Do other animals have a sense of self? Yes: great apes, dolphins, elephants, and magpies 
pass some form of the mark-and-mirror test (reviewed by Suddendorf and Butler, 2013), 
demonstrating that they have a sense of self that is very similar to that of young human 
children. Mirror self-recognition is a visually based discrimination of the self, and this has a 
limited distribution among animals, but clearly animals do distinguish self from other in 
touch. (If the reader doubts this, sneak up on a sleeping cat and lightly tickle it — if a startle 
response is elicited, then the cat is discriminating self-generated touch from other-generated 
touch.) While it remains a puzzle why so few animals recognize themselves in mirrors 
(visually), nevertheless, many animals clearly do recognize foreign activity at their skins 
(cutaneously). Interestingly, only humans and the other great apes have been reported to 
display the triad of mirror self-recognition, frequent tickling of others, and laughter while 
being tickled. It would be a profitable avenue of future research to investigate whether these 
activities implicate a quality of social engagement (known as intersubjectivity) not present in 
other animals. Thus, shared laughter, combined with a sense of self, might form the basis of a 
special, joyful quality of intersubjective engagement. 
5 
 
 
Where can I found out more? 
Bard, K.A. (2002). Primate parenting. In Handbook of Parenting, Second Edition, Volume 2, 
Biology and Ecology of Parenting, M. Bornstein, ed. (Mahwah, N.J.,Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates), pp. 99-140. 
Bard, K.A. (2008). Development of emotional expression in chimpanzee and human infants. 
Psychol. Bull. Novosibirsk State Un. 2, 98-105.  
Bard, K.A., Dunbar, S., Maguire-Herring, V., Veira, Y., Hayes, K.G., and McDonald, K. 
(2014). Gestures and social‐emotional communicative development in chimpanzee 
infants. Am. J. Primatol. 76, 14-29. 
Bard, K.A., Todd, B., Bernier, C., Love, J., and Leavens, D.A. (2006). Self-awareness in 
human and chimpanzee infants: What is measured and what is meant by the mirror-
and-mark test? Infancy 9, 185-213. 
Blakemore, S.-J., Frith, C.D., and Wolpert, D.M. (1999). Spatio-temporal prediction 
modulates the perception of self-produced stimuli. J. Cogn. Neurosc. 11, 551-559. 
Blakemore, S.-J., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnstone, E.C., and Frith, C.D. (2000). The perception 
of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity 
experiences: Evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psych. Med. 30, 1131-
1139. 
Chambon, P., and Haggard, V. (2012). Sense of agency. Curr. Biol. 22, R390-R392. 
Davila Ross, M., Owren, M.J., and Zimmerman, E. (2009). Reconstructing the evolution of 
laughter. Curr. Biol. 19, 1106-1111. 
Ladygina-Kohts, N.N. (2002). Infant Chimpanzee and Human Child (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). (Originally published 1935, in Russian.) 
Leavens, D.A. (2009). Animal communication: Laughter is the shortest distance between two 
6 
 
apes. Curr. Biol. 19, R511-R513. 
Panksepp, J., and Burgdorff, J. (2003). ‘‘Laughing’’ rats and the evolutionary antecedents of 
human joy? Physiol. Behav. 79, 533-547. 
Plooij, F. (1979). How wild chimpanzee babies trigger the onset of mother-infant play - and 
what the mother makes of it. In M. Bullowa (Ed). Before speech: The beginning of 
interpersonal communication. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp223-243. 
Seldon, S.T. (2004). Tickle. J. Amer. Acad. Dermat. 50, 93-97. 
Singer, D.G., Golnikoff, R.M., and Hirsh-Pasek, K. (2006). Play=learning: How play 
motivates and enhances children's cognitive and social-emotional growth. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Suddendorf, T., and Butler, D.L. (2013). The nature of visual self-recognition. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. 17, 121-127. 
 
1School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex, BN1 9QH, UK. 
2University of Portsmouth, Centre for Comparative and Evolutionary Psychology, King 
Henry Building, Portsmouth PO1 2DY, UK. E-mail: davidl@sussex.ac.uk or 
kim.bard@port.ac.uk 
 
 
Figure 1. Tickling in great apes. 
Top row: conspecific tickling. Jengo, an infant gorilla (left) and an infant chimpanzee (right) 
display obvious joy in being tickled by conspecifics. Currently, there are few reports of active 
tickling in animals, outside the great apes; this is an area requiring further study. Bottom row: 
heterospecific tickling: Joni (left) and Lucas (right) laughing while being tickled by humans. 
Although not fully visible in this photograph, Lucas is displaying a tickle-solicit, indicating 
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the base of his own neck with his index fingers. Photo credits: top left: photograph of Jengo--
Associated Press; top right: mother and infant chimpanzee (J. Schneider, reproduced with 
permission from Bard, 2002); bottom left: Photograph of Joni being tickled by N. Ladygina-
Kohts (Ladygina-Kohts, 2002); bottom right: Photograph of Lucas successfully soliciting a 
tickle from Kathy Gardner Hayes (E. Ferrelli, reproduced with permission from Bard, 2008).  
 
Figure 2. Simplified, speculative schematic of the experience of tickling. 
The ascending sensory tracts carry different qualities of skin sensation: the dorsal column 
delivers fine touch, the lateral spinothalamic carries pain and itch, and the anterior 
spinothalamic transmits deep touch. According to the hypothesis described by Seldon (2004), 
simultaneous stimulation of the dorsal column and the lateral spinothalamic induces 
knisemesis, whereas simultaneous stimulation of the lateral and anterior spinothalamic 
columns induces gargalesis. However, whether the sensations are perceived as tickling or not 
depends on whether the touch is self-generated or other-generated (Blakemore et al., 1999); 
this is depicted in this figure as a comparison of a predictive efferent copy and the actual 
sensory information. Although the outcome of this comparison is dichotomously depicted 
here as attributable to the self or not, actually there are degrees of ‘selfness’. If this 
hypothetical mechanism is correct, then any animal that can be tickled may be displaying a 
sense of self.  
 
In Brief: 
A quick guide to tickling, a form of laughter-evoking play that can be considered as an index 
of agency, with a discussion of its taxonomic distribution and its possible relationship to 
traditional measures of self-recognition. 
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